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Law and Disorder in NineteenthCentury Kentucky
Robert M. Ireland*
While nineteenth-century Kentucky produced fine horses,
hemp, and whiskey, she excelled most in crime. The New York
Times referred to Kentucky as the Corsica of America and then
added that the Italians actually were more civilized in their criminal
activity.' Speaking at mid-century, Garrett Davis contended that
only Arkansas and Mississippi rivaled Kentucky in capital crimes. 2
In the words of a delegate to the constitutional convention of 1890,
Kentuckians were "denounced outside of [their] limits of jurisdiction by the press of the whole country as being a lawless and bloodthirsty kind of people." 3 By 1890 most observers found no serious
competition for Kentucky in murders or any other category of
crime.' Even those counties not afflicted by feuds found themselves
awash in bloodshed by the end of the century.
Almost all commentators on the problem blamed the "system"
for permitting Kentucky's crime problem to grow steadily throughout the nineteenth century. By "system," critics meant those officers and citizens charged with making and enforcing laws against
criminal activity. These included prosecutors, trial and appellate
judges, grand and petit jurors, legislators, sheriffs, and governors.
Lawyers permeated the system, not only serving as judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, but also increasingly dominating the
legislative and executive branches. Indeed, twenty-one out of Kentucky's thirty-one nineteenth-century governors were lawyers.'
Critics asserted that the failure of the criminal justice system
to punish criminals not only permitted the guilty to escape but also
encouraged others to commit crime. Crime hindered the State's
economic growth and sullied its reputation in general. In the opinion
* Professor of History, University of Kentucky. A.B., University of Nebraska, 1959; J.D.,
Stanford University, 1962; Ph.D., University of Nebraska, 1967. Author of three books: THE
CouNTY CouaRs INANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY (1972); THE COUNTY IN KENTUCKY HISTORY (1976);
LIrrLE KINGDOMS: THE COUNTIES OF KENTUCKY, 1850-1891 (1977).
1.

N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1878, at 4, col. 6.

2.

REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849, at 688 [hereinafter cited as 1849 DEBATES].
3. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 588 [hereinafter cited as 1890-1891 DEBATES].
4. See generally H. REDFIELD, HOMICIDE, NORTH AND Sotrr: BEING A COMPARATIVE
VIEW OF CRIME AGAINST THE PERSON IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES 36-62 (1880).
5. See L. COLLINS, HISTORY OF KENTUCKY (1874).
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of one eastern Kentucky resident, "[n]o Commonwealth of this
Union . .. is more blest with natural facilities for development and

the enrichment of the country than Kentucky. Emigration is kept
from among us by the name we bear, . . . that we legislate and our

courts construe laws in favor of criminals."
Open discussion about the crime problem in nineteenthcentury Kentucky furnishes historians with much information
about the realities of the criminal justice system from the prosecutors to the governor, a subject largely ignored by historians.
Throughout the century, the commonwealth's attorneys were the
principal prosecutors of crime. Until 1850 the commonwealth's attorneys for the most part were appointed by the governor; thereafter, they were elected. The commonwealth's attorneys numbered
from ten to nineteen during the first half of the century and nineteen
during most of the second half of the century. In 1891 the legislature
increased their number to thirty. Although some contended that the
commonwealth's attorneys generally performed their duties competently, most observers held negative opinions about the officers
ranging from mild chagrin to utter contempt. A few observers, including Ben Hardin, the famous antebellum lawyer, regarded the
office as "a mere nothing," 7 attracting only attorneys who had failed
at everything and who depended upon political favor in order to
survive. Most critics, however, recognized that the job was difficult
no matter how well trained its occupant might be. Because prosecutors represented entire circuits or districts and not single counties,
they were required to follow the circuit court and to try cases in
numerous locations during the course of a year. This meant that
prosecutors generally operated in unfamiliar places at a pace that
usually did not afford adequate time for preparation. The following
is the testimony of a commonwealth's attorney about the realities
of this institutional haste and the handicaps it created:
I have, on many occasions, gone to a Court when I had never seen a witness
on behalf of the Commonwealth. The Judge sat upon his bench, and called
the case .

.

.. I handed the indictment to the Sheriff, and he went to the door

and called the witnesses; the witnesses answered "Ready," and within five
minutes we were selecting a jury to try that case, never having had an opportunity to talk to a single witness in reference to what they knew about the
commission of the offense; never having had a history of the case given me by
any one, when there were able counsel defending the criminal, which is always
the case-especially if he has money to back him-and hurried into a trial
without time to deliberate and understand the case. This is the attitude that
a Commonwealth's Attorney is often placed in."
6. 1890-1891 DEBATEs, supra note 3, at 588.
1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 673.
8. 1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1680.

7.
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"[L]ike a rat in a strange garret,"' the prosecutor's inability to
prepare adequately for his cases often constituted "a loop-hole by
which criminals . . . escape[d]." 0

The necessity to rush into cases prevailed even though in most
circuits the position of commonwealth's attorney was only a parttime job. Most criminal cases were tried in the circuit court, which
had a crowded civil docket. By statute the courts were required to
try criminal cases first, but pressure to get to the civil cases caused
judges to hurry through criminal matters as quickly as possible."
Apparently because their pay as prosecutors was relatively poor and
because they often had their own private practices, prosecutors did
not spend the time that the court was attending to civil business
preparing for the next batch of criminal cases.
Although some critics charged that commonwealth's attorneys
were overpaid, most admitted that a good defense lawyer could earn
from two or three cases what a prosecutor gained from an entire
year's employment. 12 Moreover, even though the prosE.cutors worked
as commonwealth's attorneys only part time, their private practices
apparently suffered." For most of the century, prosecutors were paid
principally by fees, receiving a percentage of fines recovered." Because generally the law imposed fines only in misdemeanor and
minor felony cases, the system of payment encouraged commonwealth's attorneys to prosecute misdemeanors and minor felonies
and to avoid lengthy major felony trials that often resulted only in
imprisonment. Thus, the system of pay created another loophole for
the criminal.
Compounding the difficulty of the job-and some argued it was
the most difficult job in state government-influential local residents traditionally hounded the commonwealth's attorney to persuade him to drop charges against friends and relatives under indictment by the grand jury. In some feud-infested counties, private
armies threatened prosecutors, forcing more than a few to abandon
attempts to try cold-blooded murderers and other members of warring factions." Critics accused the commonwealth's attorneys of
cowardice and nonfeasance, while the prosecutors pleaded self9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 4052.
Id. at 1680.
See id. at 3274, 3463.
See id. at 1694.
Id. at 4057.
See 1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1680; 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 672.

15. See 1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1105-07.
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preservation in the face of anarchy." Not surprisingly, the best lawyers in a community seldom sought the job, and when one took it,
he often found relinquishing the responsibility nearly impossible.
Charles Bronston, an able Fayette County lawyer, became commonwealth's attorney for his circuit in 1878. When he attempted to
resign several years later, he found to his consternation that "no
lawyer of any experience in the district" would have the job, and
he reluctantly continued in the office rather than risk a return to
incompetent prosecution.17
Faced with poorly prepared prosecutors who were encouraged
try
misdemeanors rather than major crimes, and with better paid
to
and often more skillful defense attorneys, wealthy victims of crime
or their survivors frequently hired private counsel to assist the prosecution in order to enhance the chances of conviction.' Sometimes
private counsel assumed the entire responsibility for the prosecution. In some cases the victim's family had to hire a special prosecutor to gain a trial of the accused because the commonwealth's attorney had been persuaded by influential friends of the defendant to
file away the charges. A widow of a wealthy and influential resident
of Perry County "had to fee the lawyers to prosecute" the murderer
of her husband and vowed that "she would rather give everything
she had and work the balance of her life . . . than to compromise
. . ."' Ben Hardin volunteered to act as the special prosecutor of

an alleged murder of a child because the commonwealth's attorney
believed that the accused was innocent. Hardin secured a conviction, but not absolutely certain himself of the defendant's guilt, he
went to the hanging hoping to hear a last-minute confession. He
did.2 0
In 1884 the general assembly attempted to shore up the prosecutorial system by requiring county attorneys to assist commonwealth's attorneys in the trial of felonies. 21 County attorneys, legal
advisors to county governments on matters such as processing
claims against the county and opening and closing roads, prosecuted certain minor offenses, such as disturbances of the peace, and
represented the Commonwealth during preliminary hearings of
more severe offenses.2 2 The legislators hoped that the county attor16. See Louisville Courier Journal, June 26, 1885, at 8, col. 4.
17.

1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 4169.

18. See id. at 4044.
19. Id. at 1122.
20. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 681.
21. An Act to amend the General Statutes and to enlarge the duties of county attorneys,
1883 Ky. Acts, ch. 1066.
22. THE GENERAL STATUTES oF KENTucKY 177-82 (J. Bullitt & J. Feland, eds. 1888)
[hereinafter cited as GENERAL STATUTES].
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ney's residence in the forum and his familiarity with the crime, its
witnesses, and jurors, would enable the commonwealth's attorney to
surmount the obstacles that the system of "institutional haste"
previously had constructed. The reform proved sufficiently successful to prompt some delegates to the constitutional convention meeting six years later to propose the replacement of the commonwealth's attorney with county attorneys as the exclusive prosecutors
for the State. Convinced that it would be difficult to find a qualified
attorney in every county and that local influences might undermine
the office, opponents of the reform narrowly prevailed.2
At first blush, judges in nineteenth-century Kentucky appeared
to preside over their local criminal courts like medieval barons. Ben
Hardin contended that a judge had "more power in his theatre, the
court, than the president of the United States in his theatre."24
Sheriffs, jailers, constables, and lawyers all catered to the local
judge. County officials needed the judge's approval of their accounts, and the local lawyers hoped that they would win his favor
and thereby gain new clients. Until 1854 criminal defendants prosecuted for offenses punishable by imprisonment could not appeal
convictions; thus most rulings during a trial could not be challenged
before another tribunal. Furthermore, the legislature did not issue
a criminal code of practice until 1854. This condition not only gave
judges plenary power over certain phases of criminal trials, such as
the introduction of evidence, but also created criminal laws unique
to particular districts. In other words, during the first half of the
nineteenth century, there was a decided lack of uniformity in the
criminal law of Kentucky. For example, a Barren County Circuit
Court judge ruled that a slave found quilty of a capital offense was
entitled to benefit of clergy and ordered him released.2 Two months
later a Warren County Circuit Court judge ruled that a slave convicted of arson was not entitled to the benefit of clergy and sentenced him to be hanged.2 In another instance, one circuit court
ruled unconstitutional an act of the legislature limiting voir dire
examination, while another declared it valid.2 Such inconsistencies
apparently were numerous and prompted the constitutional convention of 1849 to authorize the legislature to permit appeals from
felony convictions, a reform it enacted in 1854.2
23.

1890-1891

24.

1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 328.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 685.

DEBATES,

supra note 3, at 4041-4101.

CODE OF PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN KENTucKY

§ 327 (1854).
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Despite these powers, judges were significantly constrained in
other ways. Until 1854 judges had only a limited right to instruct
juries, which in most jurisdictions then could ignore their instructions and decide the case as they pleased. The lack of uniformity
that characterized judges and criminal law in general also characterized judges and their power of instruction in particular. In most
districts, judges would not instruct the jury unless both the prosecution and the defense so requested. The judge then would inform the
jury that it could find the law to be different from the instructions.
In other districts, judges routinely instructed the jury although neither party requested instructions. Usually, these judges also advised
the jury that it was the ultimate finder of law as well as fact. In a
few jurisdictions, if requested by either party, the judge instructed
the jury and ruled that its instructions were binding on the jury and
were not to be questioned by the parties. In most districts, however,
either party in final argument could contest the instructions of the
judge. One observer recalled that in a certain trial a defense attorney moved unsuccessfully to quash an indictment for larceny on the
grounds that it failed to describe sufficiently the property allegedly
stolen, but argued successfully the same point to the jury and
thereby secured an acquittal for his client.29 In another case, where
the judge did not instruct because both sides had not agreed, one
member of the jury, woefully ignorant of the law, voted to find the
defendant guilty of manslaughter although he believed that he was
legally insane. After all, the juror declared, the defendant had
slaughtered a man." In those districts where judges claimed only a
limited right to instruct, defense attorneys sometimes took great
liberty with the law to fabricate defenses for their clients. Once a
jury accepted the dubious propositions, they frequently became an
indelible part of the law despite the chagrined rantings of subsequent prosecutors. The 1854 criminal code of practice ameliorated
the problem somewhat by requiring judges to issue written instructions to juries upon the motion of either party.3 ' The code of 1854,
however, proved to be a mixed blessing because the court of appeals
ruled that its provision on instructions eliminated the judge's right
to comment on the evidence, a privilege he possessed before the code

was enacted. 32
The privilege and practice of criminal defendants swearing
judges off the bench further limited the ability of judges to enforce
29. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 835.
30. Id. at 835-36.
31.

CODE OF PRACriCE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN KENTUCKY § 226 (1854).

32.

Brady v. Commonwealth, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 282 (1875).
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effectively the criminal law. By statute, a defendant, if supported
by the affidavits of "two reputable persons not kin or counsel,"
could force a judge to withdraw from the defendant's trial by asserting under oath that he believed the judge would not "afford him a
fair or impartial trial."- The members of the local bar then would
elect from their number a special judge. The problem was especially
pronounced in feud-ridden counties where defendants turned the
statute on its head by routinely swearing unbiased judges off the
bench in favor of partisans."
Especially during the second half of the century, critics complained that judges did not attend to their criminal docket as expeditiously as they might; consequently, indictments took as long as
two years to come to trial." The problem became so acute in some
counties that representatives from these places persuaded the general assembly to create special criminal courts to supplement the
circuit courts in handling criminal cases. Even these tribunals did
not substantially shorten the delay in trying crimes in some districts. Arguing that the establishment of special courts constituted
an unnecessary burden on the taxpayers, a lawyer from Allen
County contended that if judges worked harder and more efficiently, they could cope with the criminal docket. He pointed out
that a newly elected circuit judge in his district did twice as much
work as the former circuit judge and criminal court judge combined." Others noted that the existence of special courts only in
certain places simply added to the parochial nature of the criminal
justice system and the confusion that it produced. Still worse, they
added, was the tendency of the legislature to authorize more terms
for some courts than for others. 7
Some judges' habit of failing to hold court in certain places
compounded the delay in trying accused criminals. A Carroll
County resident reported that a criminal court judge in his district
"frequently" failed to hold court in his county. The problem grew
worse after the judge's party failed to nominate him for circuit
court judge. Thereafter, he told Carroll County residents to "go to
hell," and failed completely to hold court there. 3 Although the
legislature provided that in the regular judge's absence the lawyers
of the affected locale could elect a special judge from their number,
it did not provide effective penalties against the errant judge. In
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

GENERAL STATUTES, supra note 22, at 241.

1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1164, 3400.
See id. at 3049.
See id. at 3052.
See also id. at 3319-26.
Id. at 3328-29.
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1852 and again in 1881, the legislature passed statutes providing
that if a judge failed to hold court, the cost of hiring a substitute
would be deducted from his salary. The court of appeals, however,
declared both acts unconstitutional.39 An effort at the 1890 constitutional convention to have such a provision inserted into the
new charter of government failed to secure a majority vote.
Some defendants suffered from delays in holding their trials,
but others benefited. Naturally, those defendants without funds to
post bail endured the most hardship. A Logan County resident
charged that in his district, defendants who could not furnish bail
routinely spent from six to twenty-four months in jail before trial.
This subjected defendants to the extreme discomforts of the local
jail and their families to poverty because of the absence of the
principal breadwinner. Others complained that the long delay often
permitted the guilty to go free. Some escaped from jail, and others
were acquitted at trial because witnesses had died, disappeared, or
forgotten important facts, or because jurors reflected the changed
attitude of the general public that had grown sympathetic toward
the poor unfortunate defendant languishing all those months in
jail."
Besides judges' inability to clear dockets and some judges'
habit of not holding court at all, judges allegedly contributed in
other ways to Kentucky's leniency toward accused criminals. Even
defense attorneys admitted that judges tended to overemphasize the
doctrine of reasonable doubt when instructing juries.' Consequently, the rule seemed to guarantee acquittal for those who had
"powerful and influential connexions [sic]."42 Likewise, judicial
construction of the privilege against self-incrimination arguably
gave the defendant an extra advantage since he was permitted to
invoke it even though he himself had introduced "the particular
topic upon which he [was] being interrogated."" Champions of law
and order also accused judges of ignoring national standards and
construing the law of double jeopardy in a manner overly lenient to
defendants. 4 However accurate these complaints were, attempts to
redress them largely failed.
As soon as the court of appeals was given the right to hear
appeals from criminal trial courts, it was blamed also for the grow39.
(1852).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Perkins v. Auditor, 79 Ky. 306 (1881); Auditor v. Adams, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 120
1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 3049; 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 681.
See 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 686-87.
Id. at 686.
1890-1891 DEBATEs, supra note 3, at 953-54.
Id. at 566-69; see O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 333 (1872).
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ing softness on crime. Critics accused the high tribunal of reversing
convictions by using "technicalities" whose collective effect was
said to add to the aura of permissiveness surrounding the criminal
justice system." If undue leniency resulted from the right of appeal,
the responsibility for this condition probably rested with the lawyers
as well as the judges. A lawyer testified in 1890 that he once examined an appellate record in which the court of appeals reversed a
conviction although, in the lawyer's opinion, the defendant had
been given a fair hearing and richly deserved hanging. Much to his
horror, he had discovered that the defense attorney in his bill of
exceptions had "false[ly] and fraudulent[ly]" misrepresented the
actions of the lower court, a deceit compounded by the failure of the
commonwealth's attorney to correct the record." If this practice
was widespread, and it may have been given the unscrupulous nature of some defense attorneys and the inattentiveness of certain
prosecutors, that the high tribunal reversed more than a few convictions is no wonder.
The legislature increased the parochial nature of the criminal
justice system not only by failing until 1854 to provide a criminal
code of practice, but also'by enacting at each session a wide variety
of local statutes establishing special crimes for individual judicial
districts, counties, or parts of counties. For most of the century,
residents of individual counties besieged legislators with petitions to
enact local statutes outlawing various activities. What resulted was
a panoply of local statutes making conduct criminal in one county
although innocent in another. Soon the legislature and the courts
lost track of the local laws; consequently, some contradicted others." Defendants constantly complained of confusion and failure of
notice, and many were either acquitted by sympathetic and equally
confused juries or pardoned by governors. The 1890-1891 constitutional convention largely remedied the situation by prohibiting
most local statutes."
Lawyers, whether judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys,
were not the only members of the criminal justice system of
nineteenth-century Kentucky. Laymen also played an important
role serving as grand or petit jurors. By statute, if the punishment
for an offense was more than a fine or imprisonment of fifty days,
the Commonwealth could not prosecute anyone for the offense unless by indictment from a grand jury.49 Until 1891 grand juries con45.
46.
47.
48.

1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1265.
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1291.
Ky. CONST. § 59 (1891).

49.

GENERAL STATUTES, supra note 22, at 807-09.
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sisted of sixteen residents of the county in which the court was being
held, and the votes of at least twelve grand jurors were needed for
an indictment. Thereafter, grand juries consisted of twelve jurors,
with nine votes needed to indict."0
In Kentucky, as elsewhere in the nation, pressure mounted
throughout the century to abolish the grand jury because its members were generally ignorant of the law and its traditions, because
it operated inefficiently, and because it was too susceptible to the
behest of the prosecutor. These efforts failed in Kentucky, perhaps
because critics of the grand jury failed to make their case. Even a
commonwealth's attorney, an officer that stood to gain power if the
institution were abolished, admitted that grand juries frequently
lived up to their ancient responsibility of shielding the accused
from irresponsible charges. In the words of a prosecutor, "according
to my experience and the experience of gentlemen with whom I have
talked, with all its faults, the right of investigation by the Grand
Jury is one of the greatest protections the citizen has."5 '
Nor did grant juries always adhere to the wishes of prosecutors.
At least in one area grand juries universally defied the wishes of the
commonwealth's attorneys by refusing to bring indictments against
those accused of purchasing votes. This failure to indict accounted
in large part for the continuing tradition of vote buying in Kentucky,"z a practice that was not curtailed until the Constitution of
1891 provided for the return of the secret ballot. Vote buying apparently constituted one of the few areas in which nonfeasance by
the grand juries accounted for the existence of crime. Petit juries,
on the other hand, contributed more significantly to this problem."
The petit jury formed the most important part of the criminal
justice system of nineteenth-century Kentucky. Most criminal defendants were entitled to jury trial, and almost all who did not plead
guilty availed themselves of this opportunity. Comprised of twelve
men, a jury needed a unanimous vote for a verdict. Although they
disagreed over the precise meaning of the rule, all legal experts in
the Commonwealth acknowledged that juries in criminal trials were
the ultimate triers of law as well as fact." At least before 1854, some
juries deliberated without being instructed, and throughout the century they alone determined the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
The court of appeals ruled that although the trial judge might
50. Ky. CoNsT.
51.

§ 248 (1891).

1890-1891 DEBATEs, supra note 3, at 1221.

52. Id. at 1875.
53. Id. at 1893; see 1849 DEBATEs, supranote 2, at 676.
54. See, e.g., 1849 DEBATrs, supra note 2, at 1085-86.
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instruct the jury about the law of the case, the jury had the power,
if not the right, to ignore the instructions when deciding upon a
verdict. 5
Until 1838 the process of selecting potential jurors was a very
informal haphazard affair-the sheriff simply rounded up as many
candidates as he- could find. In 1838 the legislature required the
sheriff to initiate a more formal system to assemble a minimum
number of citizens from which to pick twelve-man petit juries."
This reform did not cure many of the evils it was supposed to cure,
and late in the century observers complained that sheriffs ignored
the law and relied upon courthouse bums who served on juries in
order to collect a little wine money." Critics charged that these
"miserable wretches . . . in defiance of the most positive proof of

the guilt of the [defendant]" almost invariably rendered verdicts
of acquittal."
More serious was the widespread practice of packing juries.
Defendants, through bribery or simple appeal to friendship, persuaded someone to volunteer for service in order to hang the jury.
Apparently, in some places it was almost routine for defendants
with money to hire at least one juror to insure a divided vote. Some
defendants packed the jury so proficiently that they secured verdicts of acquittal. Officials in antebellum Jefferson County tried for
years to convict a notorious counterfeiter for making and passing
bogus bank notes, but failed entirely because of the man's ability
to pack the jury. Ben Hardin recalled a client named Carter who
was accused of murdering a wealthy boat owner and selling the boat
and cargo. After four trials ended in hung juries, the judges concluded "that the whole county had made up their opinion, and that
no trial could be had;" the governor then released the accused.
Subsequently, Hardin not only learned that Carter had paid a juror
in each case, but also discovered that he was guilty of the crime for
which he had been indicted." Garret Davis once helped prosecute
one of the "most diabolical and outrageous murders that was ever
perpetrated," but the defendant escaped with a verdict of manslaughter because he had slipped five of his friends onto the jury. 0
Although three of the friends were later indicted for perjury, the
murderer escaped while out of jail on bail."
55. Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 1 (1858).
56. An Act to Alter the Mode of Selecting Petit Jurors, 1838 Ky. Acts, ch. 960.
57. Louisville Evening Post, Feb. 4, 1879, at 2, cols.1-2.
58. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 676.

59. Id. at 680-81.
60. Id. at 687.
61. Id.
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Despite protests from civil libertarians, law and order delegates
at the 1849 constitutional convention believed they could remedy
the problem of packed juries by giving prosecutors a limited number
of peremptory challenges, a privilege that they did not have for most
of the antebellum period." Four years later, the framers of the first
code of criminal practice gave prosecutors five challenges in felony
cases and three in misdemeanor proceedings, whereas the defense
had twenty in felony cases and three in misdemeanor cases." But
the reform, like so many others, did not eliminate the evil, and
commentators continued to complain of tainted juries."
Mid-century reformers also tried to curtail the evil of packed
juries by expressly authorizing in the new constitution the selection
in certain instances of jurors from outside the county of the trial.
Supporters argued that such a reform not only would curtail the
practice of bribing jurors but also would facilitate the trial of notorious criminals who benefited from the judicial rule that jurors must
not have formed or expressed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the accused. A Jessamine County resident noted that in his
county outrageous murders had gone unprosecuted because jurors
who had not formed an opinion about the culpability of the defendant could not be found. Delegates to the 1849 constitutional convention defeated a provision authorizing jurors from outside the
county and retained the constitutional guarantee to all criminal
defendants of a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
vicinage . . . . "I "Vicinage" commonly was held to be synonymous with "county." Nevertheless, five years later the framers of
the criminal code of practice provided for out-of-county jurors when
the trial judge was "satisfied . . . that it [would] be impracticable
to obtain a jury free of bias in the county wherein the prosecution
is pending . . . . "" Oddly enough, while out-of-county jurors were
used at least in some parts of the Commonwealth to convict defendants, during the period of the third constitution no one challenged
the constitutionality of the code provision before the court of appeals. Widening the geographical area of potential jurors did not
cure the problem of tainted juries, and by 1888 ingenious prosecutors seized upon another method of securing impartial jurors-by
interpreting vicinage to mean adjacent counties. 7
The epidemic of feuds that afflicted many Kentucky counties
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

CONST. art. 2, § 39 (1850).
CODE OF PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN KENTUCKY § 205
1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, 1163-64.
1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 797.
CODE OF PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN KENTUCKY § 195
1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 450-51.

Id. at 674-79. See also Ky.

(1854).
(1854).
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following the Civil War compounded the problem of selecting impartial juries. In feud-ridden counties it was often impossible to find
jurors who were not members of rival factions or who were unintimidated by them. Finally in 1888, facing a condition of anarchy in
Perry County and entertaining no hope of selecting a jury with the
courage to convict, officials secured from the legislature a statute
authorizing a change of venue from Perry County to Clark County.
The general assembly so acted despite the general notion that only
a defendant had the right to secure a change of venue. Asserting
that the transfer to Clark County had brought peace to the county,
accomplishing what soldiers and residents themselves could not do,
reformers at the 1890-1891 constitutional convention supported a
provision in the new state government structure that would permit
the Commonwealth generally to secure a change of venue if it believed a transfer would result in a fairer trial."
Opponents of this reform contended that to permit the Commonwealth to secure changes of venue would work an undue hardship on indigent defendants who could not afford to pay expense
money to their witnesses during a trial out of their home county.
Pointing to the Perry County experience, these critics argued that
there "were men who had not a dollar in the world, and who had to
sell their clothes to pay their witnesses to go to Clark."" Submitting
that the change would work no hardship because the Commonwealth paid for indigent defendants' witnesses, reformers contended
that changing the venue law was the most practical way to deal with
feud-stricken counties. Stating that he had been besieged with
many proposals to curtail feuding, Governor Buckner confirmed the
opinion that changing venue offered the most promising solution.
The convention endorsed Buckner's views and authorized the general assembly to "provide by a general law for a change of venue
. . . for both the defendant and the Commonwealth, the change to

be made to the most convenient county in which a fair trial can be
obtained." 0 The legislature did so shortly thereafter."
Even if not. packed or prejudiced in favor of the defendant,
juries manifested a general sympathy for criminals. Prosecutors and
their allies contended that the public was soft on crime and tended
to sympathize with those indicted for criminal activity. In 1849 a
commentator wondered "[w]hy is it . . . that the sympathies of
68.
69.
70.
71.
162.
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gentlemen appear to flow so freely in favor of those who are charged
with crime," 72 and forty years later another noted that "[tihe tendency of every man is to sympathize with and pity the. . criminal
. . . ."

Toward the end of the century, an observer lamented that

"the verdicts of juries in criminal and penal cases have done more
to destroy confidence in the administration of the criminal law
than" almost anything else.74 Another claimed to have "heard jurors
admit, in penal cases, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, that they had added together the different periods voted for
by the different jurors, and divided the result by twelve."7 Perhaps
reflecting this "jugglery," 7 in 1877 a Nicholas County jury that
sentenced a murderer to only eleven years in prison was thanked
by the defendant himself, who expressed "surprise at the light
sentence," admitting that he believed "he deserved the extreme
penalty of the law." 77 Despite this testimony, efforts to permit twothirds of a jury to convict failed.
Governors, often themselves lawyers, formed a significant part
of the criminal justice system. All of Kentucky's constitutions empowered the governor to remit fines and forfeitures and to grant
reprieves and pardons. Held in one form or another by governors of
most states and based upon the ancient practices of English kings,
the power to remit and pardon constituted an increasingly important element of the governor's business in the nineteenth century.
Before the Constitution of 1850, governors spent most of their time
appointing civil and military officers and pardoning and remitting
convicted criminals. After 1849 pardoning and remitting became, in
the words of Governor Buckner, "the great labor of the office" because petitions continued to increase in number and the Constitution of 1850 substantially curtailed the power of appointment."8 In
the words of a United States Senator from Kentucky, the governor
had become nothing but a "big Squire," a term that suggested that
his most important function was pardoning and remitting. To strip
him of these powers, as was proposed at the 1890-1891 constitutional
convention, would in the opinion of one delegate remove one of the
few "dignities and responsibilities" that made the office "worthy of
the ambition and the hopes of the rising, gifted spirits of the future
72.
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. . . ." Because Kentuckians had no parole board until 1888, the
governor's power was especially important.
Probably because governors were so lenient, convicted criminals frequently applied for remission of fines or pardons, or both. In
the opinion of some, Kentucky governors granted more pardons and
remissions than chief executives of other states. One observer
claimed that governors of Michigan had granted only 447 pardons
in a seventeen-year period, while a particular governor of Kentucky
had granted 845 pardons in less than sixteen months. 0 Because
petitions were so common, governors, especially before 1854, became a court of last resort. Not surprisingly, the implementation of
this quasi-judicial function produced much controversy. Some
argued that governors caused more harm by remissions than by
pardons. Normally, misdemeanors were punishable only by fine;
nevertheless, this category of crime encompassed a number of disruptive and potentially dangerous antisocial activities including
carrying concealed weapons, gambling, serving liquor to minors,
disturbing the peace, and disturbing Sunday worship. By the reportedly wholesale remission of fines, governors allegedly encouraged the commission of these crimes. Prosecutors claimed that gubernatorial permissiveness toward the indiscriminate carrying of concealed weapons led to "much of the bloodshed which has given
Kentucky the unenviable name of 'the dark and bloody ground

. . ..

'"81 Likewise, one critic submitted that the routine remission

of fines imposed upon the operators of tippling houses, grog shops,
faro tables, and other gambling devices produced incalculable evils
to the Commonwealth. "[Flrom these corrupt beginnings," they
stated, "flow those streams of crime which afterwards disgrace the
Commonwealth . . . ."82
Hypocrisy characterized the rantings of many prosecutors who
themselves played an important part in the remissions scandal.
Before 1850 governors apparently often remitted the portion of fines
that paid commonwealth's attorneys for their services.83 Complaints
by prosecutors and doubts about the constitutionality of this practice caused the framers of the Constitution of 1850 to prohibit the
remission of the prosecutor's portion of fines.84 Curing one abuse led
to another. To collect their portion of fines from elusive defendants,
prosecutors often promised defendants that they would sign their
79.
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petitions for remission, thereby adding considerable authority to
these documents and enhancing the chances of favorable action by
the governor.85
However abusive remissions were, pardons aroused the greatest
fury. A former prosecutor from Knox County claimed that notorious
murderers when convicted laughed openly in the realization that
they soon would be pardoned. Indiscriminate pardoning did "more
to embolden crime, interrupt the peace of society, and trample
under foot the morals of the community, than all other causes combined."" Convicted criminals with money and influential friends
often "seduced" governors into pardons by false and misleading
petitions." The pardoning process required no formal proceeding,
and normally governors received petitions from the defense only.
Defendants with powerful friends, often their attorneys, found it
relatively easy to gather an impressive number of signatures on
petitions pleading for their release. A Carter County lawyer aptly
described the realities of signature gathering:
And how are signatures to these petitions, filled with exaggerated, and
sometimes false statements, procured. One signs it to accommodate a friend;
a second, after continued importunity; a third through sympathy; a fourth
carelessly, because . .. it costs nothing; and others have signed it, a fifth-the
wily and desining [sic] politician or demagogue-for the purpose of attaching
to himself the friends and relations of the convict, for future political purposes
... and often times too, without so much as reading the statements they
certify-until a long list of names are [sic] procured."

The victim of the crime, his family, the prosecution, or those
favoring the prosecution seldom petitioned the governor, often because they had no notice that a pardon was being sought. Thus,
governors normally were given only one side of the case, often by
fast-talking, highly persuasive lawyers hired for the job or by influential members of the community doing a favor for the petitioner.
Subjected to such tremendous pressure, governors sometimes
lacked the courage to resist and pardoned to relieve themselves of
the burden of the moment. Adding to the ex parte nature of the
proceedings, commonwealth's attorneys seldom took the time to
discover which of the criminals they convicted were seeking pardons." They rarely presented their side of the question to the governor, and governors sought opinions from prosecutors too infrequently.
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Since there was no formal system, governors pardoned inconsistently, one executive "grant[ing] a pardon where another ...
refuse[d] it" under precisely the same circumstances. Much depended upon the "emotions of the incumbent . . . and . . . upon

his temperament" rather than a set of fixed standards. Consistent
with the entire criminal justice system, this favored the rich and
discriminated against the poor." Convicted criminals without funds
could not hire lawyers or others to gather signatures or represent
them before the governor. They could not circulate petitions themselves because usually they were imprisoned promptly upon conviction, being unable to post an appeals bond.
Despite these abuses, the pardoning power had its defenders.
Describing governors as the fountainheads of mercy, supporters of
an unlimited power to pardon submitted that it was necessary to
correct the abuses of the criminal justice system. How else could a
defendant remedy the excesses of unscrupulous prosecutors, tyrannical judges, and perjury-ridden witnesses?" They argued that it
was far better for ninety-five persons to be pardoned wrongfully
than for one innocent man to be imprisoned.9 2 The pardoning power
was needed to temper excessive punishment sometimes meted out
by judges overly concerned with the letter of the law. Governor J.
Proctor Knott defended the pardoning of two teenage boys who had
been sentenced to a public whipping after being found guilty of
drunkenly stealing sixty cents worth of goods. They had been pardoned, Knott contended, to spare them "the most degrading punishment that could be conceived by a sensible mind," which would
have "ruin[ed] them for life" and compelled "their parents to go
with bowed heads sorrowing to the grave." 3 Governor Luke P.
Blackburn pardoned large numbers of prisoners in the state penitentiary to call attention to the legislature's failure to remedy the institution's inhumane conditions."
In the majority of cases, governors pardoned only after defendants had been convicted and had actually served part of their
sentence in prison. Kentucky, however, was one of only four states
that permitted pardons before trial. This privilege produced the
most criticism of all. In the opinion of reformers, pardoning before
trial compounded all of the alleged deficiencies of the pardoning
power. The rich and influential benefited; the poor and helpless
90. Id. at 1087.
91. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 721-28.
92. 1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 1277.
93.
94.

Id. at 1321-22.

See JOURNAL OF THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 36-37 (1881).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

298

[Vol. 32:281

suffered through discrimination. Notorious murderers hoodwinked
unknowing governors into pardons before trial, while humble citizens guilty of highly technical violations of the law were forced to
serve time in the penitentiary. A wealthy farmer from Todd County,
who ambushed and killed a young man after a trivial argument,
secured a pardon before trial. Unknown to the governor, earlier
during the trial of one of the farmer's enemies, the same farmer had
threatened a judge with a knife and pistol in open court." Another
farmer was pardoned before trial although he had shot his victim
in the back after the latter had what was described as a routine
argument with the killer's wife, the victim's sister." A governor
pardoned three wanton murderers from Perry County, while a fellow
resident had been imprisoned for bigamy despite his belief that his
first wife was dead.17 Governors pardoned bluegrass distillers before
trial although they repeatedly polluted streams and sold liquor in
violation of local option laws."
Despite these horror stories, there were those who defended the
power of pardon before trial and conviction." Governor Buckner
argued that wholesale pardons before trial were necessary to quell
a feud in an eastern mountain county.oo Reiterating theories advanced to defend the pardoning power in general, others argued
that it was a corrective to prosecution for merely technical violations
0 Furthermore, pardoning before trial spared the Comof the law.o'
monwealth of the expense of trial and possible incarceration. Most
tellingly, defenders stressed that denying the governor the power of
pretrial pardon would enhance the power of the commonwealth's
attorneys and increase their tendency to prosecute trivial offenses
to collect percentages of fines. 02
Throughout the century, especially at the two constitutional
conventions, reformers tried to restrict the pardoning power. While
few advocated the complete abolition of the power, many proposed
the elimination of pardons before trial."o3 Other propositions included a requirement that governors publicize petitions including
signatories to give the prosecution's side an opportunity to be heard
and to discourage insincere and ill-considered signings, the creation
95. 1890-1891 DEBATES, supra note 3, at 110.
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of a board of pardons to supplement or supplant the governor, and
a system of full accounting for all pardons to the legislature and the
public. But despite the growing number of outcries against pardoning, the power was left largely intact. The only meaningful reform
occurred toward the end of the century, when the legislature created
a parole board. 0'
Counties and their officers also underscored the parochial nature of the criminal justice system and contributed to its shortcomings. The sheriff, the principal peace officer of the Commonwealth,
devoted more and more of his time to civil business such as tax
collecting because these duties multiplied, and because they furnished most of his income. When sheriffs did attend to law enforcement, they sometimes did so as partisans, especially if their county
was engaged in one of the many feuds that ripped Kentucky following the Civil War. Their numbers per acre ranking second in the
nation, Kentucky's counties were the "storm centers from which
feuds" were created and "from which antagonisms radiated." 05
Often beginning during election campaigns for county offices, these
brawls frequently involved gangs led by rival peace officers. It is
symbolic that those who were charged with keeping the peace in
nineteenth-century Kentucky often did the most to disrupt it.'os
Nineteenth-century Kentuckians responded paradoxically to
their criminal justice system. Although they complained constantly
about the inadequacies of their constabulary, they refused to appropriate funds necessary to establish more efficient police forces. And
while they carped continually about the ineffectiveness and ineptitude of prosecutors, the slowness and timidity of judges, the permissiveness of juries, and the leniency of governors, they also expressed
equal concern about the rights of the accused and the convicted. 0o
By their ambivalence, nineteenth-century Kentuckians reflected an
internal conflict that historically has characterized the response of
Americans to the problem of crime. A free and dynamic society
inevitably spawns crime. In their efforts to control antisocial behavior, freedom-loving people dare not be too effective for fear of eliminating the liberty that helped produce the problem. This Gordian
Knot of nineteenth-century Kentucky is the enduring dilemma of
America.
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